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THE USE OF CONVENTIONAL
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMBATING
TERRORISM: A MAGINOT LINE FOR
MODERN CIVILIZATION EMPLOYING THE
PRINCIPLES OF ANTICIPATORY SELF-

DEFENSE & PREEMPTION
MAJOR JOSHUA

E. KASTENBERG

1

We do not differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and
civilians; they are all targets in thisfatwa.
2
Osama bin Laden

On 11 September 2001, 2,938 persons were killed in New York City
and Washington, D.C., after members of an Islamic-based terrorist
organization flew hijacked commercial airplanes into the New York World
Trade Center towers and the Pentagon building. 3 Another forty-four persons
were killed the same day in the Pennsylvania countryside after airplane
passengers of United Airlines Flight 93 sought to abort a related terrorist
hijacking whose apparent destination was Washington, D.C.4 On 13 October
2002, over 200 people were killed in a Bali nightclub as a result of the terrorist
actions. 5 In the Philippines, violent terrorist attacks against civilians have
become so frequent as to seem routine. 6 And, in Kenya and Tanzania, civilians
'Major Kastenberg (B.A., U.C.L.A.; M.A., Purdue University; J.D., Marquette University;
L.L.M., Georgetown University Law School with highest honors), is Deputy Staff Judge
Advocate for the 52 "d Fighter Wing, Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany. Major Kastenberg
thanks Lieutenant Colonel Gregory F. Intoccia, USAFR, for his professional, tireless and
detailed reviews of several drafts of this article, and the insight that he provided. Major
Kastenberg also thanks Elizabeth, Allenby, and Clementine Kastenberg for their love, insight,
and continued support.
2 John Miller, Interview with Osama bin Laden, at http://www.ABC.com (visited June
10,
1998).
3 The attacks killed 189 at the Pentagon and 2,749 at the World Trade Center. USA TODAY,
May 4, 2004, at 7D. See generally Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United
States Relating to InternationalLaw, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 237, 238-40 (2002). See also, e.g.,
Ruth Wedgewood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 328,
329 (2002).
4 See http://special.scnp.com (last visited July 1, 2004).
5 See, e.g. Headline, Bali Bomb Suspect Admits Militant Ties, http://www.CNN.com
(last
visited Nov. 8, 2002).
6 There are two principal Islamic terrorist groups operating in the Philippines, namely
the "Abu
Sayyaf" ("Abu Sayyef' alt. spelling), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The
Abu Sayyaf is examined in this article because of its members' active support of terrorist
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with no apparent relationship to U. S. foreign policy were killed by persons
who specifically conducted attacks7 with the intentions of altering U. S. foreign
policy and killing "non-believers."
These instances of terrorism directed primarily against civilians have
renewed popular, legal and other scholarly debate regarding the parameters of
use of force in both the international and domestic contexts. For instance, in
response to the 11 September 2001 attack on the World Trade Center, the
United Nations (U.N.) Security Council adopted Resolution 1368, which
recognizes the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in
accordance with the U.N. Charter. 8 Additionally, President George W. Bush
has advanced a doctrine of enemy status and state responsibility. 9 This
doctrine, apparently loosely based on a traditional law concept of "aiding and
abetting", is summarized in President Bush's statement that the United States
would consider as enemies "terrorists and those who harbor them."10
In addition to renewed debate on the limits of use of force generally,
there has emerged one regarding use of force in the international context,
focusing on both the notions preemption and anticipatory self-defense. In the
face of mounting international religious-based terrorism and evolving plans to
counter this threat, to a pressing question that has emerged on the world stage
is whether anticipatory self-defense and preemption are legitimate international
law concepts.
This article analyzes the existing concepts of the right of self-defense
and preemption under international law. Part I quickly reviews both the
evolution of warfare and the state of religious-based terrorism. The former
presents a useful starting point for understanding customary international law
activity, their commitment to literalist Quaranic scripture, and their affiliation with al Qaeda.
See, e.g., Headline: Philippines Rebels Raid Towns, Two Civilians Killed, REUTERS, April
24, 2003; see also Headline: Bombs Kill up to 15 at Wharf in the South Philippines, REUTERS,
April 2, 2003. For commentary, see, e.g.,Charles V. Pena, Blowback: The Unintended
Consequences of Military Tribunals, 16NOTRA DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB POL'Y 119, 129
citing Lally Weymouth, We Will Do The Fighting,WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2002, at B 1.
(2002),
7
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1189, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3915th mtg. at 110, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1189
(2001). Suicide bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya killed more than 200
people, including twelve U.S. citizens, and were allegedly perpetrated by the al Qaeda terrorist
network. In response, in 20 August 1998, the United States launched seventy-nine Tomahawk
missiles against terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant
that the United States identified as a "chemical weapons facility" associated with Osama bin
Laden. See Murphy, supra note 3, at 161. For an insightful statement on the goal of killing
"non-believers," see James V. Schall, S.J., On the Justice and Prudenceof this War, 51 CATH.
U. L. REv. 1, 11-12 (2001).
8 S/RES/1368, 12 Sept 2001.
9 See The White House, National Security Strategy, Sept 17, 2002, available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html.
1OSee Murphy, supra note 3, at 244, citing Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on
the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 1347 (Sept. 20, 2001).
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and its subset, generally referred to as "the laws and customs of war."
Customary international law provides context to the application and
shortcomings of contemporary codified international law, and, therefore,
serves an important heuristic function in understanding the international legal
limits on combating this increasingly frequent form of terrorism.
It is important to note that this article does not advocate a model of
warfare that is either anti-Islamic or that would employ counter-terrorist
measures that do not comply with international law. Indeed, it condemns any
model that would do either." There is no dispute, however, that members of
religious-oriented terrorist groups, typically Islamic fundamentalist
organizations, appear, in their rising prominence, to be ever more willing to
rely on terrorist tactics, and to view their movement as a new religious war. 1
Because no international law doctrine exists in a vacuum, this section is
important in understanding the limits to which the international nations may
respond to the new terrorist threats.
In Part II, contemporary instruments of international law are examined.
In particular, both Article 51 of the U.N. Charter 13 and the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) decision, Nicaragua v. United States,14 are reviewed for their
respective definitions of the right to self-defense. The limitations expressed
therein are of particular importance because over time, technical innovations
and other societal shifts have changed how war is fought, in a manner beyond
what was envisioned when the U.N. Charter was adopted. This is particularly
true with respect to unconventional phenomena such as the type of terrorism
analyzed in this article. Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter
provides state signatories an "inherent" right of self-defense in response to an
"armed attack."' 15 It allows member states a military-based self-defense in
" Islamic terrorist groups are not, of course, the only religious-oriented terrorist organizations.
For instance, the U.S. State Department has listed the Kach & Kahane Chai as an illegal terror
organization. This Jewish group advances the doctrine of returning Israel to "a biblical state,"
by any means. Likewise, the State Department placed on this list the Ulster Volunteer Force
(UVF), a Protestant group that professes to view Northern Ireland as an exclusive Protestant
enclave. However, unlike the Islamic terrorist groups discussed in this article, neither the
Kach & Kahane Chai nor the UVH seeks to create an authoritarian religious world.
12 See Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Culture of Ugliness in Modern Islam and Reengaging
Morality, 2 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 33, 35 (2003); see also, e.g. Murphy, supra note 3,

at 240, quoting, UK Press Release, 10 Downing Street Newsroom, Responsibility for the
TerroristAtrocities in the UnitedStates,
13

21-22 (Oct. 4, 2001). Id.

U.N. CHARTER art. 51.

14Nicaragua

v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (27 June).

15Article 51 reads:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this
right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
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either their respective individual or collective capacities.' 6 Also, although not
covered in detail, Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter places limits on a state's
ability to threaten the use of force against another state. 17
While some prominent scholars of international law contend that
Article 51, like all articles in the U.N. Charter, is to be read narrowly, 18 it
appears that the current U.S. administration has departed from that view and
has opted to adopt the doctrines of both anticipatory self-defense and
preemption.
For instance, it may be argued that the post-1I September
invasion into Afghanistan constituted an act of anticipatory self-defense, while
the decision to wage war in Iraq was more a matter of preemption. Examining
the status or viability of these two doctrines under international law is the key
focus of this article, as well as understanding the distinctions and uses of each
within the context of grappling with international religious-based terrorism, the
newest threat to international peace and security.
Part III will tie the two prior sections together by analyzing the
potential use of preemption in the current context of dealing with terrorism.
Part III also provides analyzes of terrorism as an "international crime," and
state assistance to terrorist organizations. This section then assesses the
legitimacy of the separate doctrines of anticipatory self-defense and
preemption. In the end, this article concludes that both anticipatory selfdefense and preemption are credible theories in limited circumstances,9
including those in which an organization employs a visible strategy of terror.'
Where such strategy is employed, the group and its supporters may be
permissibly subject to a response employing military force.
INTRODUCTION
A. The Evolution of Interstate Warfare, the Doctrine of First Attack, and
the Emergence of Modern Terrorism
The evolution of warfare and the development of customary
international law (and its subset, the law of war) are tightly interwoven. It is
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
U.N.
CHARTER art. 51.
16
1d,

17Article

2(4) reads:
All members shall refrain in the international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
1S See, e.g., Eric Pedersen, Controlling International Terrorism: An Analysis
of Unilateral
Force and ProposalsFor MultilateralCooperation,8 TOLEDO L. REV. 209, 213 (1976).
'9 As evidenced by, inter alia, group membership, historical pattern of violence and stated
goals.
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not possible to understand international principles applicable to warfare
without their being placed into some historical context. Consistent with this
general observation, it is difficult to review and address the vitality of the
concepts of self-defense, anticipatory self-defense, and preemption without
having an understanding of the evolution of, and interrelationship between,
warfare and customary international law. Because these concepts were first
developed during a period that pre-dates the rise of modem technology, and
during a period in which it was reasonably expected that large scale
international violence would be restricted to conventional clashes between
large nation states, it is challenging to understand the application of these
concepts to modem forms of terrorism. Our discussion, therefore, next
examines in some detail conventional customary international law and
interstate warfare norms within the context of modem religious-based
terrorism.
B. Conventional War Between States and the Interwoven Development of
Customary International Law
Warfare has a long history that pre-dates recorded civilization. The
fact that civilian populations are victims during warfare is nothing new to
history. Indeed, ancient history is replete with instances of cities being sacked
For example, the Old Testament states
and peoples decimated as a norm.
21
may be destroyed and people enslaved.
cities
enemy
conditions under which
And some of the earliest recorded instances of fighting show whole
populations were considered as combatants. 22 This ancient view of warfare,
20

21

See, e.g., DOYNE DAWSON, THE ORIGINS OF WESTERN WARFARE 1 (1996).
For example, an ancient norm of war can be found in the Old Testament. The war code of

DEUTERONOMY states:

When you draw near a city to fight against it, offer terms of peace to it. And if its
answer to you is peace and it opens to you, then all the people who are found in it
shall do forced labor for you and shall serve you. But if it makes no peace with you,
but makes war against you, then you shall besiege it; and when the Lord your God
gives it to your hand you shall put all its males to the sword, but the women, and the
little ones, and the cattle, and everything else in the city, all its spoil, you shall take as
booty for yourselves; and you shall enjoy the spoil of your enemies, which the Lord
your God has given you. Thus you shall do to all the cities which are very far from
you .... you shall save nothing alive that breathes, but you shall utterly destroy then,
the Hittites and the Amorites, the Canaanites and the Perizittes, the Hivites and the
Jebusites, as the Lord your God has commanded; that they may not teach you to do
according to all their abominable practices which they have done in the services of
their gods, and so to sin against the Lord your God.
DEUTERONOMY 20:10.
22 See, e.g., BRIAN CAVEN, THE PUNIC WARS 273-295 (1980).

After Carthage's second revival

following the defeat of Hannibal, the Roman Republic's government concluded that the
necessity of Carthage's destruction far outweighed any economic gain that Rome could accrue
by a continued trade relationship. Id. See also DAWSON, supra note 20, at 1.
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which was at one time widely accepted by sovereigns and scholars alike, in
part contributed to the destruction of whole societies.23 For instance, in the
Iliad, Homer wrote that the sack of Troy included the slaughter of males of all
ages. 24 It may also be noted that in the First Crusade (1099-1103), the
cities, and
Christian Crusaders sacked Jerusalem, along with several other
25
slaughtered the inhabitants regardless of age, gender, or religion.
While this article focuses on modem, international legal concepts of
use of force, it is important to note that much of contemporary international
laws, particularly "the law and customs of war," was designed to prevent the
type of slaughter witnessed through much of history. Likewise, it is evident, as
discussed below, that many modem religious-based terrorists continue to
disregard any recognition of these legal concepts.
During the last 400 years, the concept of legitimate self-defense and
other accepted practices of warfare have continued to slowly evolve. These
norms have developed against the backdrop of the limitations of the
technology of the day. Customarily, warfare occurred with ample warning, not
only to the participants, but also to states located near the fighting.26
For instance, the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) began when
ambassadors from the Holy Roman Emperor, Maximilian, notified the leaders
of Bohemia that restrictions were being placed on their practice of the
Protestant faith. 27 With this notification came a warning that should the
restrictions be ignored, armed intervention would result. 28 The Bohemian
leaders responded, in what has become known as the "Defenestration 2of9
Prague," by throwing the ambassadors out of a second story window.
Austrian Military forces allied to Maximilian then responded by invading

23

See, e.g., THE BOOK OF WAR: 25 CENTURIES OF GREAT WAR WRITING xix (John Keegan ed.,
1999).
24 See, e.g., Homer, THE ILLIAD (Alston H. Chase et al. eds., 1950).
25 See, e.g., MORRIS BISHOP, THE MIDDLE AGES 96-99 (1968), citing the Twelfth Century
chronicler Raymond of Agiles:
Some of our men cut off the heads of our enemies; others shot them with arrows, so
that they fell from the towers; others tortured them longer by casting them into flames.
Pikes of heads, hands, and feet were to be seen in the streets of the city. It was
necessary to pick one's way over the bodies of men and horses. But these were small
matters compared to what happened at the Temple of Solomon. If I tell the truth, it
will exceed your powers of belief.., men rode in blood... Indeed it was a just and
splendid judgment of God, that this place should be filled with the blood of
unbelievers who had suffered so long under their blasphemies.
Id.
26 See, e.g., J.V. POLISENSKY, THE THIRTY YEARS WAR 1 (Robert Evans trans. 1971); see also
C. V. WEDGWOOD, THE THIRTY YEARS WAR, 77-80 (2d ed. 1949).
27 Wedgewood, supra note 26, at 78.
2
1Id. at 79.
29 id.

92-The Air Force Law Review

Bohemia, eventually leading to a conflict that directly included all major
European powers except England.3 °
The Thirty Years War marked a turning point in international warfare
because of the size and scope of the conflict, as well as the impact of that war's
conclusion on the borders of Europe. 3 1 It also marked a turning point in
international law scholarship relating to the laws and customs of war. Notably,
during this period of conflict, Hugo Grotius (1618-1648), wrote De Jure Belli
Ac Pacis Libiri Tres, which has had a large impact on international law
scholarship and what would be viewed as permissible acts of warfare. 32
Grotius observed that an important distinction should be made between
combatants and non-combatants to a conflict, with combatants subject to the
rigors of warfare, and non-combatants spared inasmuch as possible. 3
Additionally, Grotius believed that any resort to armed force should occur only
for legitimate purposes and after diplomacy failed.
Other writers also
developed notions to make warfare more humane by by insisting that warring
35
nations seek to minimize inflicting suffering on non-combatant populations.

30

Id. See also Polisensky, supra note 26, at 258. Polisensky writes, "The War was such a

protracted and intensive undertaking that it demanded entirely new methods of military
organization and the maintenance of armies." Id.
31 See, e.g., GEOFFREY SYMCOX, WAR DIPLOMACY AND
IMPERIALISM 1618-1763 1 (1974),
citing MARSHAL SAXE, REVERIES ON THE ART OF WAR.
32 In 1625, appalled by the slaughter of the Thirty Years

War, Hugo Grotius explained why he
chose to write De Jure Belli Ac PacisLibiri Tres (Three Books on the Law of War and Peace),
the work commonly acknowledged as inaugurating the modem law of nations:
Throughout the Christian world I observed a lack of restraint in relation to war, such
as even barbarous races should be ashamed of. I observed that men rush to arms for
slight causes or no causes at all, and that when arms have once been taken up there is
no longer any respect for law, divine or human; it is as if, in accordance with a
general decree, frenzy had openly been let loose for the committing of all crimes.
Id., cited in Mark W. Janis, Law War and Human Rights, InternationalCourts and the Legacy
of Nuremberg, 12 CONN. J. INT'L L. 161, 162 (1997), quoting HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI
AC PACiS LIBRI TRES 20 (Kelsey trans. 1913). Grotius has been cited by federal courts on 198
occasions. See, e.g., Herrera v. United States, 222 U.S. 558 (1912) (decision effecting the laws
of war at sea). See also, e.g., The London Packet, 18 U.S. 132, 5 Wheat. 132 (1820)
(disposition of seized private property in wartime). See also, United States v. Yousef, 327
F.3d
56 (2d Cir 2003).
33
See ROSALYN HIGGINS, GROTIUS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
UNITED NATIONS PERIOD, IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 267, 275 (Hedley Bull, Benedict

Kingsbury & Adam Roberts eds. 1990).
34 See, e.g., Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionalityand Force in InternationalLaw, 87 AM. J.
INT'L L. 391, 396 (1993); see also Michael T. Morley, The Law of Nations and the Offenses
Clause of the Constitution, 112 YALE L. J. 109, 125 (2002).
35 See, e.g., EMERIC DE VATTEL, LES DROIT DES GENS, OU, PRINCIES DE LA
LoI NATURELLE,
APPLIQUE A LA CONDUITE ET Aux AFFAIRES DES NATIONS EY DES SOUVERAINES [The Law

of Men or Principles of National Law Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and
Sovereigns] (Charles G. Fenwick trans. pub'd. as THE LAW OF NATIONS, Wash. D.C. 1916)
(1758). See also GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE (1980)).
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One means for enforcing humanitarian norms in warfare revolved
around lessening the efficacy of the "surprise attack. 3 6 With the rise of the
industrial age and the empires of European powers expanding around the world,
it became recognized that successful war strategy must emphasize the timing
and speed of transporting troops to the battlefield. 3 Moreover, as the
population of Europe increased, as other industrialized nations rose to
prominence and as economies expanded, the size of standing armed forces
grew considerably. 38 By the Nineteenth Century, European wars were won, in
large measure, by the military that was mobilized and transported to the front
the fastest. For example, in 1870, a Prusso-German Army defeated a larger
39
French Army in France while the latter was still under a state of mobilization.
Also, while surprise attacks were nothing new to warfare, over time,
with advances in technology, the ability to carry out such attacks became
greater.40 The Japanese surprise attacks on the Russian Fleet at Tsushima in
190541 and the U. S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor are examples in.which such
ability had significant military impacts, at least in the short-term. However,
these examples are by no means the only ones. 42 Historically, the use of a
"surprise attack" was justified on a claim of self-defense. 43 However, such
36

id.

37 SyMCOX,

supra note 31, at 200. See also,

MARC

FERRO, THE GREAT WAR, 1914-1918, 28-

31(1960).
38
NEIL M.

HEYMAN, DAILY LIFE DURING WORLD WAR I, 12 (2002). In August 1914, the
German Army fielded 800,000 men in uniform, and an additional 2,900,000 men were
mobilized from the reserves. The French Army, in comparison, numbered 540,000 men, with
an additional 1,400,000 being mobilized as reserves by the end of the month. During World
War I, France fielded a military force of 7.8 million men. Roughly one-fifth of the total
population wore a military uniform sometime during the war. Over one million of these men
were killed in combat. Id. at 15.
39

See, e.g., MICHAEL

HOWARD, THE FRANCO PRUSSIAN WAR:

THE GERMAN INVASION OF

(2001). The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 was a preview of World Wars I and II, in
the sense that each war involved a mass mobilization of populations, and industrial advantages
played a direct role in victory. See also FERDINAND FOCH (MARSHAL OF FRANCE), THE
PRINCIPLES
OF WAR (1918).
40
See, e.g., GORDON PRANGE, AT DAWN WE SLEPT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF PEARL HARBOR
FRANCE,

(1981).
41 See also, JOHN A. WAITE, THE DIPLOMACY OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 125 (1964).
Waite writes:
The Japanese principle, stated by Foreign Minister Baron Jurato Komura, was that
time was on the Russian's side, who were building up military strength in the region.
Japan felt that Korea and Manchuria were rightly theirs. The Japanese could not
prevail in a prolonged war and decided to strike first.
42 Id.
See also EDWIN A. FALK, FROM PERRY TO PEARL HARBOR, THE STRUGGLE FOR
SUPREMACY IN THE PACIFIC (1974).
43 Id. For example, Prime Minister Tojo's

cabinet believed that war with the United States was
a necessity as a result of the de facto economic blockade policy established by Franklin
Roosevelt. While this belief was roundly considered meritless by the war's victors, it did
supply the cabinet and emperor the basis for accepting the Pearl Harbor attack and subsequent
invasion of the Philippines.
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attacks were seldom in actuality a surprise to the warring nations, because
often the attacks were preceded by failed diplomacy and national hostility.
Historically, armed conflict between nations was preceded by official
warnings. For example, before World War I, Great Britain Prime Minister
Herbert Asquith's government publicly claimed as the justification for
Britain's entry into the war alliance obligations and German violation of
Belgian neutrality. 44 On 4 August 1914, British Foreign Minister Lord Edward
Grey warned the German Government "to evacuate Belgium or conflict would
ensue." 45 In response, German Chancellor, Bethman-Holweg, called the
neutrality agreement a "scrap of paper," and proclaimed that "necessity knows
no law" to the Reichstag.46
While states rarely took into account the laws of war when formulating
strategy, pre-World War I German strategy fundamentally ignored prevailing
laws and customs of war.4 7 For instance, the 1914 invasion of France and
Belgium was based in large part on a plan by the then former Chief of the
German General Staff Graf Alfred von Schlieffen, which called for an invasion
of Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands, regardless of the neutral status
of those states.48 Regardless of the conduct of German forces in the occupied
portions of Belgium and France, the invasion of a neutral clearly violated an
international agreement considered to have the force of law.
After the war, violations of the law of War against civilian populations
received some attention in the trials of German officers. 49 However, in what
has become known as the "Leipzig Trials," there was a general failure to
successfully criminalize the conduct of brutalizing civilians. 50 More
importantly, at the time, the German entry into war, was not per se viewed by
the international community as an international crime, but rather as a question
of responsibility.5 1 The Treaty of Versailles required Germany to accept all
"See, e.g., BRIG. GEN. SIR
ed. 1968); see also MARC

JAMES EDWARDS, A SHORT HISTORY OF WORLD WAR I 9-24 (2d.
FERRO, THE GREAT WAR 40 (1969); and see also, BARBARA
TUCHMAN, THE GUNS OF AUGUST (1959).

45 Ferro, supra note 44, at 45.
46
id.
47 id.

See, e.g., Gunther E. Rothenberg, Moltke, Schleiffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic
Envelopment, in MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY (1986).
49 See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouini, Current Development: The United Nations Commission
of
Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 784, 785
48

(1994).
50 See Timothy L.H. McCormack, Conceptualizing Violence, 6 ALB. L. REV. 681, 698-99
(1997), citing JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY
OF PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 9-10 (1982).

51 See, e.g., Jonathon A. Bush, The Supreme Crime and its Origins: the Lost Legislative
History and the Crime of Aggressive War, 102 COLUMB. L. REV. 2324, 2331 (2002).

Professor Bush writes:
The terrible war that began in August 1914 seemed to make a mockery of these legal
rules from the previous half century, but it also fueled a demand on the Allied side for
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war guilt and pay reparations. 52 While German political leaders were not
specifically charged with aggression or prosecuted for violations of the law of
war, the fact that Germany was required to accept all war guilt at Versailles
indicated a reticence to permit a "first strike" doctrine in conventional
53
international relations.
The experience of World War II confirmed this reticence, with the
adoption of Article 51 of the U. N. Charter. For instance, at the conclusion of
World War II, the allies constructed two separate tribunal systems in Europe
and Asia for prosecuting individuals who violated the laws and customs of war.
These tribunals, called the International Military Tribunals (IMT), de facto
criminalized armed aggression because several of the individuals prosecuted
had taken part in the respective decisions to wage war. 54 For instance, one of
the jurisdictional offenses was titled "crimes against the peace.", 55 These
crimes were defined as the "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war
of aggression, or a war in -violation of international treaties, agreements or
assurances, or participation in a common
plan of conspiracy for the
56
accomplishment of any of the foregoing.',
Surprise attacks, then, were viewed as a move of armed aggression, but
only insofar as these attacks occurred without provocation. 57 Consequently,
the tribunal's decision to charge the crime of aggression could not be read so
broadly as to prevent a state from defending
itself, preemptively, in the face of
58
armed invasion from another state.
A debate over the meaning of self-defense under international law has
continued since the IMT. In putting the debate in perspective, some postwar crimes trials for culpable Germans. Most of the attention centered on specific,
widely publicized atrocities such as the rape of Belgian women, the machine gunning
by U-boat crews of lifeboat victims, the burning of the Louvain library and the
destruction of the Soissons and Senlis cathedrals, the executions of British Captain
Fryatt and Nurse Edith Cavell, the mistreatment of Allied POWs, and, for American
audiences, the sinking of the Lusitania. But a few commentators included the demand
that Kaiser Wilhelm II and his senior ministers be punished for planning and initiating
a war of aggression ....
Id. citing Otto Erickson, A JudicialReckoning for William Hohenzollern, 22 LAW NOTES 184,

186(1919).
52

See generally Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, arts. 231-263, reprinted in BERNARD M.

BARUCH, THE MAKING OF THE REPARATION AND ECONOMIC SECTIONS OF THE TREATY

(1970).

53See Ferro, supra note 44, at 123.
54 See, e.g., Leila Nadya Sadat, Symposium Issue: The InternationalCourt: The Establishment
of the InternationalCourt:From the Hague to Rome and Back Again, 8 MICHIGAN ST. U.DETROIT C. L. INT'L L. J. 97, 106 (1999).

55 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280, Article 6(a).
56 id.
17 See,

e.g., Theodore Meron, Defining Aggression for the International Criminal Court, 25

SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 1, 6 (2001).
58

id.
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Second World War examples are helpful. In particular, the Arab-Israeli
conflict has been the source of several such examples.
Since World War II, there have been numerous instances in which one
state threatens one or more other states with an armed buildup of forces,
accompanied by official statements of impending war. The June 1967 so
called "Six Day War " between Israel on the one side, and Egypt, Jordan and
Syria on the other, is a clear example of this phenomena. 59 In the months prior
to the Israeli air attack against Egyptian military targets, Egyptian president
Gamel Nasser ordered United Nations peacekeepers out of the Gaza and Sinai
regions bordering Israel. 60 The Egyptian leader ordered a massive military
buildup in preparation of an armed invasion into Israel. 61 Also, Egyptian and
other Arab government officials publicly enunciated their desire to "drive
Israel into the sea."' 62 In reaction, Israeli strategists were convinced that their
best hope of victory was to strike Egyptian military forces first, and
subsequently, in June 1967, the Israeli Air Force attacked targets in Egypt. 63
Within six days, Israel secured the Sinai peninsula, the West Bank and Golan
Heights .64 The Israeli decision to engage in a first strike against Egyptian,
Syrian, and Jordanian military targets65 resulted in debate regarding the
international law norms for self-defense.
After the Six Day War, the Middle East has continued to be a region of
dangerous conflict. There exists little resolution regarding acceptance of Israel
by Arab states, and little resolve by Israel to accept a Palestinian state. In 1973,
warning.
Egyptian and Syrian military forces attacked Israel without diplomatic
66 This attack coincided with the Yom Kippur religious holiday, 67 the most
important holiday in Judaism. 6 8 The Israeli political and military leadership
59

See, e.g., MICHAEL OREN, Six DAYS OF WAR, JUNE 1967 AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN
MIDDLE EAST 63 (2002).

6 Id. Israel shares a border with Egypt to its southwest, Jordan to its east, and Syria and

Lebanon to its north. In 1967, its only non-hostile border was the Mediterranean Ocean to its
west.
61
Id.at64.
62

63

Id.
Id. at 67. Oren notes that the U. S. government, occupied in Vietnam, made no promise of

aiding Israel if Egypt attacked. Moreover, some evidence suggests that the Soviet government
encouraged Nasser to strike first. The Israelis were aware of the Kremlin's interest in such an
attack. Id.
64 Id. In 1967, the Sinai Peninsula belonged to Egypt. It served as a "buffer region" between
Egypt and Israel. Likewise, the Golan Heights, a series of escarpments forming a border
Syria and Israel, has served a similar function.
between
65
See, e.g., Quincy Wright, The Middle East Crisis, and Amos Shapira, The Six Day War and
the Right of Self Defense in 2 THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT 5-21, 107-32, 205-20 (John N.
Moore ed., 1974).
66 See, e.g., MARTIN VAN CREVELD, MILITARY LESSONS OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR,
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES (1975). See also, e.g., Louis Rene Beres, Why Israel Should
Abrogate the Oslo Accords, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. REV. 267 (1997).
67 Id.
68 Id.
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had believed that their opponents would respect a religious holiday, if nothing
more, out of concern over potential international reaction. Israeli forces
eventually recovered most lost positions with the assistance of U.S. airlift
support. 69 After Israeli forces became poised to conquer Syria, they were
thwarted, in part, by a Soviet threat of entry into the conflict. 70 Although this
conflict ended by agreement between the parties, with the exception of Egypt
and Jordan, most Arab states considered themselves to be in a defacto state of
war with Israel.7 '
Another historical example worth examining for what it may reveal
about the current state of the norm of self-defense in international law, is the
Israeli attack on the Iraqi Osiraq nuclear facility in 1981. In the late 1970s, the
Iraqi government had purchased the facility from France, where it had
undergone construction at Osiraq. 72 Because the reactor was capable of both
supplying energy as well as fissile material for nuclear weapons, and because
the Iraqi government's continued strong anti-Israeli rhetoric, the Israeli
government concluded that the reactor constituted a significant "downrange"
threat to its existence. 73 In a climate of anti-Israeli terrorism, the possibility of
by Israeli officials as so likely as to pose a realistic
a nuclear strike was viewed
74
security.
Israeli
threat to
On June 7, 1981, Israeli aircraft destroyed the reactor in a raid that also
resulted in the death of a French engineer. 75 While the Israeli government
claimed a right of self-defense as its justification, its argument was not
generally accepted within the international community. 76 Indeed, both the
General Assembly and the Security Council condemned Israel's use of force
against the reactor.77 Just as in the case of Israel's. first strike during the Six
Day War, Israel's strike against the Iraqi reactor generated further debate over
the parameters of self-defense. 8

69 Id.

70 Id.
71 Id.
72

See, e.g., Lt Col Uri Shoham, The Israeli Aerial Raid Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor and

the Right of Self Defense, 109 MIL L. REV. 191 (1985). Israel's perception was reflected in a
statement issued by its government after the attack: "We were therefore forced to defend
ourselves against the construction of an atomic bomb in Iraq, which would not have hesitated
to use it against Israel and its population centers." N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1981, at A8, col. 2.
73 Shoham, supra note 72, at 208.
74 Id.

75 Id.
76

/d. at 191.

77 Id.

Id. See also Colonel Guy G. Roberts, The Counter-ProliferationSelf Help Paradigm: A
Legal Regime for Enforcing the Norm ProhibitingWeapons of Mass Destruction, 27 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 483 (1999); see also, Louis Rene Beres & Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto,
Reconsidering Israel's Destructionof Iraq's Osiraq Nuclear Reactor, 9 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 437 (1995); see also W. Thomas Mallison & Sally V. Mallison, The IsraeliAerial Attack
78
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This section has provided just a brief sampling of relevant examples
from military history. The instances presented 'show that conventional

international law norms are suited for application to traditional interstate
armed-conflict. Nonetheless, this body of law, as conventionally construed by

scholars, still presents, at best, a limited framework for defense against modem
terrorism. Below, the reasons for this conclusion become clearer as modem
terrorism is analyzed.
C. The Reemergence of Religious-based Terrorism (the Islamic Model)
The term "terrorism" is over two centuries old. While the there have
been different definitions of the term, 80 generally it is meant to refer to the
threat or use of violence with the intent of causing fear among the public, in
order to achieve political objectives. 81 A component of terrorism is to conduct
military-like operations with a strategy of pursuing, at a minimum, political
change. 82 However, the most distinguishing difference between terrorist
operations and legitimate military operations is the general attention and
willingness of the former on threatening to carry out, or carrying out, acts of
violence against civilian targets.
It is problematic to consider all groups labeled as "terrorists" as
conducting similar operations for like-minded goals. There are simply too
many organizations, with many different goals in mind. However, the general
philosophical aims and. methods employed by such groups have existed for
thousands of years, 83 they encompass a strategy seeking to create political,
religious, or social change. How wide or encompassing the goal of such social
change differs from organization to organization.
For instance, the Irish
Republican Army (IRA), discussed below, has never intended to create "an
of June 7, 1981, Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor: Aggression or Self Defense?, 75 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 417 (1982).
79 Frank Biggio, Neutralizing the Threat: Reconsidering Existing Doctrines in the Emerging
War on Terrorism, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1, 6 N.20 (2002), citing MICHAEL CONNOR,
TERRORISM: ITS GOALS, ITS TARGETS, ITS METHODS, THE SOLUTIONS 1 (1987).
80 One author of a research guide to terrorism listed 109 different definitions of terrorism. A.
Schmid, POLITICAL TERRORISM; A RESEARCH GUIDE (1984);. see also WORLD BOOK
DICTIONARY 135, 2148-49 (1973). Noting that there is.not an internationally accepted
definition of terrorism, military historian Caleb Carr recently wrote about what an acceptable
definition should include: "Certainly terrorism must include the deliberate victimization of
civilians for political purposes as a principal feature-anything else would be a logical
absurdity." Professor Caleb Carr, Wrong Definition of War, WASH. POST, July 28, 2004, at
A19.
8' See W. THOMAS MALLISON AND SALLY MALLISON, THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC PURPOSE
TERROR IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 67 (M.C. Bassiouni ed. 1975).
82 See, e.g., JAMES M. POLAND, UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM: GROUPS, STRATEGIES AND
RESPONSES 11 (1988).
83 Biggio, supra note 79, citing RICHARD CLUTTERBUCK, TERRORISM IN AN UNSTABLE WORLD
3 (1994).
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Irish World.",8 4 In contrast, the fundamentalist Islamic movements discussed
in this article desire to 5spread the word of "the Prophet" throughout the world
through armed means.8
Towards the close of the Twentieth Century, Western nations began
recognizing terrorism as the preeminent threat of the day and, accordingly,
began defining it in precise legal terminology. The United States has recently
called it "the biggest threat to our country and the world",86 and the United
States Code now defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated
violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or
clandestine agents. 87 The Department of Defense (DOD) recently defined
terrorism as "the calculated use of unlawful violence or the threat of unlawful
violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or intimidate governments or
societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or
ideological. 88 British law now defines terrorism in a similar way. Part 20 of
the British Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1989 states that: "terrorism means
the use of violence for political ends and includes any use of violence for the
purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear." 89 Although
reflecting the still underdeveloped municipal law of nations grappling with
terrorism, both the United States and Britain have criminalized terrorism, but
have not differentiated between types of terrorism within their respective
criminal codes.
While terrorist groups are not necessarily dependent on state support,
religious-based terrorist groups often receive support from states via
84See, e.g., U.S. Department of State, Appendix B: Background on Terrorist Groups for 2000.
The State Department description of the IRA's goals is fairly benign. It reads as follows:
Terrorist group fonred in 1969 as clandestine armed wing of Sinn Fein, a legal
political
movement dedicated to removing British forces from Northern Ireland and unifying
Ireland. Has
a Marxist orientation. Organized into small, tightly knit cells under the leadership of
the Army
council.
Id. Yet, it should be noted that the IRA, according to the State Department, relied on statesponsorship and has received funds and training from sympathizers in the United States.
8 See, e.g., Bassam Tibi, The Fundamentalist Challenge to the Secular Order in the Middle
East, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 191, 192-93 (1999), citing ABDULRAHMAN A. KURDI, THE

39 (1984).
See S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001).
See also Statement by the Secretary General of NATO Lord Robertson (Oct. 2, 2001) available
at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011002a.htm.
87 22 U.S.C. § 2656(d)(1).
88 Brig. Gen. Charles Dunlap Jr., International Law and Terrorism: Some 'Qs and As'for
ISLAMIC STATE: A STUDY BASED ON THE ISLAMIC HOLY CONSTITUTION
86

Operators, ARMY LAW. 23 (2002), citing Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 1-02, DOD
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 443 (12 Aug. 2002).
89 Emanuel Gross, Terrorism and the Law: Democracy in the War Against Terrorism--the
Israeli Experience, 35 LoY. L. A. L. REV. 1161, 1165 (2002), citing British Prevention of
Terrorism Act (Temporary Provisions), 1989, at 20.
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governmental-sponsored support for fundamentalist Islamic movements.9 ° The
origins of some of these religious-based terrorist groups can be traced to the
failed Pan-Arab
and Pan-Islamic movements, which began in the Nineteenth
91
Century.

Each major world religion has a core constituency of possible terrorist
groups. However, since World War II, fundamentalist Islamic movements
have emerged in the forefront of those groups willing to engage in acts of
terrorism with state backing. For instance, the organization al Qaeda, backed
by the government of Afghanistan, was based in Afghanistan until being
substantially defeated there by the U.S.-led war there. 92 Likewise, other
groups have received sanctuary and backing from such states as Syria, Libya,
Iran, and Iraq. 93 Moreover, Hizballah has received considerable aid from Syria
and Iran. 94 Hamas, too, has received financial and weapons support from not
only Syria and Iran, but also from Saudi Arabia. 95 And the Philippine-based
90 See, e.g., Audrey K. Cronin, Rethinking Sovereignty: American Strategy in the Age of
Terrorism, in 44 Survival # 2, 122 (2002). Cronin writes:
Despite its nomenclature, religious terrorism actually mixes both political and
religious motivations and is, as a result, probably the most dangerous - it has openended or less "rational" aims, is less predictable and, in recent years at least has
tended to aspire to cause more casualties than other types. Religious terrorism
represents a dangerous combination of political aims animated by the ideological
fervour of a deeply spiritual commitment - either real or (depending on the group - or
even the individual) contrived. In this type of terrorism, the "audience" may or may
not have human form, and the aims may or may not reflect a rationality that is
obvious to anyone but the "divinely inspired" perpetrator (or his followers).
Id.
91 See, e.g., Charles R. Davidson, Reform and Repression in Mubarak'sEgypt, 24 FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF. 75, 88-92 (2000) (tracing the rise and activity of the Muslim Brotherhood
organization). See also, e.g., Bassam Tibi, supra note 85, at 191-92.
92 Id. However, it had operated from the Sudan, Somalia, and Saudi Arabia, and it
received
considerable financial support from persons in several other areas. Id.
93 See, e.g., Professor Sompong Sucharitkul, Jurisdiction, Terrorism and the Rule
of
InternationalLaw, 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 311, 316 (2002).
94 See, e.g., Global Security website at, http://www.globalsecurity.org. Hizballah is also
known by different names, such as "Islamic Jihad," "Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of
Palestine," "Organization of the Oppressed, Revolutionary Justice Organization," and
"Ansarollah" (trans. "Partisans of God"). See Yonah Alexander, Middle East Terrorism:
Selected Group Profiles 33-47 (JINSA 1994) (hereinafter Group Profiles). Hizballah is mainly
dedicated to the creation of a wholly fundamentalist Shia Islamic state in Lebanon and the
destruction of Israel. See also Terrorist Group Profiles, U. S. Navy, Naval Post-Graduate
School, Dudley Knox Library (in possession of author); and Global Security website at
http://www.globalsecuritv.or , describing Hizballah's activities, ranging from the murder of
Israeli citizens to hostage taking of European and American citizens. Id.
95 See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of State release, Patterns of Global Terrorism (2000), at Appendix B.,
(in possession of author). Formed in late 1987 as an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the
Muslim Brotherhood, various Hamas elements have used politically motivated violent and
non-violent means, including terrorism, to pursue the goal of establishing an Islamic
Palestinian state in place of Israel. Hamas is a loosely structured organization, with some
elements working clandestinely, and others working openly through mosques and social
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Abu-Sayyef Group (ASG) has received aid from various Arab entities. 96 It
should be noted that some scholars of terrohism believe that fundamentalist
Islamic movements are increasingly evolving away from state sponsorship and
toward complete independence, arguably making them freer to pursue even
more dangerous acts. 97 At the philosophical and theological core of these
movements is the concept of "Jihad," meaning "holy war." 98 The concept is
generally premised. on condoning warfare against perceived enemies of
Islam, 99 employing a literalist reading of select verses of Islamic scripture.
Typically, the goals of religious-based terrorism include gross societal
change, rather than national self-determination, which is often the goal of nonreligious-based forms of terrorist organizations. Unlike state-centered warfare,
terrorism employs secrecy as its core attack strategy. 1°° Most terrorist groups,
whether religious-based or not, strike without any warning. 1 And while the
ultimate aim of such groups may be to affect policy change, unlike the conduct
of the military forces of modern nations, their attacks generally focus on
civilian non-military targets. 10 2 To militant fundamentalist Islamic terrorist
groups, the conventional "laws of war" become an unused guideline, in part,
because such laws are hardly divine. 103 Thus, international law has little or no
influence on these non-state, terrorist actors.
service institutions to recruit members, raise money, organize activities, and distribute
propaganda. Hamas personnel have conducted many attacks--including large-scale suicide
bombings--against Israeli civilian and military targets. In the early 1990s, they also targeted
suspected Palestinian collaborators and Fatah rivals. They also have received funding from
Palestinian expatriates, Iran, and private benefactors in Saudi Arabia and'other Arab states. Id.
Some fundraising and propaganda activities take place in Western Europe and North America.
Id.
96 See id. ASG engages in bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, and extortion
to promote an
independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, areas in the southern
Philippines heavily populated by Muslims. ASG raided the town of Ipil in Mindanao in April
1995--the group's first large-scale action--and kidnapped more than thirty foreigners, including
a U.S. citizen in one year alone. Id.
97 See, e.g., Edgardo Rotman, The Globalization of Criminal Violence, 10 CORNELL J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 1, 21 (2000).
98 See, e.g., El Fadl,supra note 12, at 60. El Fadl writes:
In the age of post-colonialism, Muslims have become largely preoccupied with the
attempt to remedy a collective feeling of powerlessness and a frustrating sense of
political defeat, often by engaging in highly sensationalistic acts of power symbolism.
Id.
99 Id. See also infra notes 116 and 117, and associated text.
'00 See, e.g., Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of Military
Force, 18 Wis. INT'L L. J. 145 (2000).
101Id.
102

Id.

'0' See, e.g., El Fadl, supra note 12, at 67-68. El Fadl writes:
With the deconstruction of the traditional institutions of religious authority emerged
organizations such as the Jihad, al Qa'ida, and the Taliban, who were influenced by
the resistance paradigms of national liberation and anti-colonialist ideologies, but also
who anchored themselves in a religious orientation that is distinctively puritan,
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Despite the denial by many terrorist groups that international applies to
them, it has been more frequently argued by scholars and statesmen that1 0 a4
terrorist constitute a hostis humani generis, or "enemy of the human race."
While this term emerged in the Eighteenth Century as chiefly applicable to
pirates, certain practices, universally condemned under international law, are
now embraced within the ambit of the term as well.10 5 Similarly, a growing
10 6
body of law and scholarship considers terrorist acts asjus cogens violations,
making states that aid and abet such organizations also joining in the illegal
terrorist acts.
Religious-based terrorists, such as al Qaeda, have shown a preference
for terms normally associated with warfare. 107 The use of these terms
evidences an aim of equating their actions of violence, such as crashing airlines
10 8
into buildings, with that of battlefield actions taken by opposing armies.
However, unlike the conventional actions of opposing armies, religious-based
terrorists have generally intentionally targeted civilians and civilian-related
infrastructure. This new form of terrorism, often accompanied by the rhetoric
of warfare and religious ideology, has become the newest threat to the
international order in general, and the United States in particular. Professor
Audrey Cronin states:
[W]hile we have not seen the last of inter-state war, war between
organizedstates will no longer be the driving force that it has been for

supremacist, and thoroughly opportunistic in nature. This theology is the by-product
of the emergence and eventual primacy of a synchronistic orientation that unites
Wahhabism and Salafism in modem Islam. Puritan orientations, such as the Wahhabis,
imagine that God's perfection and immutability are fully attainable by human beings
in this lifetime.
Id.
'04 Cronin,

supra note 90, at 122. See also, e.g., Jeffrey M. Blum and Ralph G. Steinhardt,

Federal Jurisdiction Over InternationalHuman Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act
After Filartigav. Pena-Irala,22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53 (1981).
105Id.

For instance, torture, hostage taking, forced labor (a modem variant of slavery), and

summary execution are now condemned asjus cogens violations. The targeting of civilians is

proscribed under several treaties and is virtually universally condemned by the international
community, thus constituting jus cogens actions. Any persons involved in any of these
activities may be seen as "an enemy of mankind."
'06See, e.g., Smith v. Libya, 101 F.3d 239 (2 Cir. 1996). The court in Smith defined jus
cogens norms as follows:
Jus cogens norms . . .do not depend on the consent of individual states, but are

universally binding by their very nature. Therefore, no explicit consent is required for
a state to accept them; the very fact that it is a state implies acceptance. Also implied
is that when a state violates such a norm, it is not entitled to immunity.
Id. See also Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Human Rights
Violations: One Step Forward,Two Steps Back? 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 71, 76 (1998).
107Cronin,

supra note 90, at 124.

108Id.
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the last 400 years orso. Ideology will be; and the underlying legitimacy
09
of the ideology will provide the centre of gravity for each side.'
This ideology is best observed in the statements of al Qaeda, which include the
declaration that "to kill the Americans and their allies - civilians and military is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it
is possible to do it';" 110 and, "every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to
be rewarded [has a duty] to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and
plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it." I 1I Likewise, the
Hamas charter provides a commandment that constitutes a Quaranic
interpretation to kill "non-believers" who govern over Muslims, whether under
democratic institutions or otherwise. 112
There is hardly a clearer example of the practices of terrorist
organizations conflicting with conventional norms of war, than their efforts to
directly target civilians. It has been long accepted that non-combatants must
be afforded greater protections than combatants. In the 1949 Geneva
Convention (IV) on the treatment of civilians in wartime, the signatory states
adopted this premise. 1 3 Likewise, in 1978, the International Committee of the
Red Cross, concerned that the four 1949 Geneva Conventions had become too
complex as a guiding statement on the laws of armed conflict, condensed
related principles into the "Fundamental Rules of Humanitarian Law
Applicable in Armed Conflicts."' '14 One such rule, Principle 7, states:

109Id.

See, e.g., Davis Brown, Use of Force Against Terrorism After September L." State
Responsibility, Self Defense, and Other Responses, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 51
(2003) citing Osama bin Laden et al., Jihad Against Jews And Crusaders: World Islamic Front
Statement (Feb. 23, 1998).
11o

I11
12

Id.

See, Hamas

Charter (Aug. 18, 1988), reported in ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AND
CONCILIATION 203, 206-07 (Bernard Reich ed., 1995), cited in Beres, supra, note 66, at 275.

The Charter reads, in part:
There is no solution to the Palestinian problem except by Jihad ....
In order to face the
usurpation of Palestine by the Jews, we have no escape from raising the banner of
Jihad ....
We must imprint on the minds of generations of Muslims that the Palestinian
problem is a religious one, to be dealt with on this premise ....
I swear by that who
holds in His Hands the Soul of Muhammad! I indeed wish to go to war for the sake of
Allah! I will assault and kill; assault and kill, assault and kill.
Id. "Hamas" is the acronym for "Islamic Resistance Movement, Harakat Muqawama
Islamiyaa", meaning "enthusiasm," "zeal," or "fanaticism." Id.
113 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
114 International Committee of the Red Cross, Fundamental Rules
of Humanitarian Law
Applicable in Armed Conflicts, in INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS (Sept.-Oct. 1978), at 248-49;
quoted in Spencer Crona & Neal Richardson, Justicefor War Criminals of Invisible Armies, 21
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 349, 363 (1996).
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Parties to a conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian
population and combatants in order to spare civilian population and property.
Neither the civilian population as such nor civilian persons shall be the
object
5
objectives."
military
against
solely
directed
be
shall
Attacks
attack.
of
In contrast, al Qaeda's core philosophy includes a literal reading of the
Quaran, which states, "fight and slay the pagans wherever you find them, and
' 16
seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them, in every stratagem.""
Likewise, al Qaeda members are guided by the Quaranic phrase
"Then nations,
'' 17
Islam."
embrace
they
until
fought
be
must
however mighty,
Thus, for a number of years the international community has embraced
the principle that the direct targeting of civilians is a clear violation of the laws
of war. Yet, this international standard is utterly rejected by key militant
Islamic-based terrorist groups. Nevertheless, it is beyond18dispute that the laws
of war apply to them, as it does to other non-state actors."
International law regarding the use of military force was designed to
regulate conventional interstate warfare in the long-term interest of nations,
and to protect civilian populations from the horror of war, to the extent
possible. Terrorist acts, which are by design and execution carried out by
those who abrogate this basic precept, and which may be supported by aiders
and abettors who do the same, must not be tolerated when there already exists
important international legal norms that may be readily brought to bear on
them." 9

115 Id.
116

Schall, supra note 6, at 12, citing Paul Johnson, Relentlessly and Thoroughly, NAT'L REV.

20-21 (Oct. 15, 2001).
117Id.

118 See Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Convention
Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287;
see also The 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions, Dec. 12, 1977, 16 I.L.M.
1391. Although the United States has not ratified the 1977 Protocols, it recognizes that various
parts of the protocols reflect customary law of war. See, e.g., DAVID BEDERMAN,

INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 230-31 (2001).
'19 In contrast, the case has been made that the codified contemporary international system

appears prostrate in its ability to defend civilians. See Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., American
Hegemony and International Law:

The Use of Armed Force Against Terrorism, 1 CHI. J.

INT'L L. 37, 38 (2000), citing Thomas and Hirsh, The Future of Terror, NEWSWEEK 35 (Jan.
10, 2000); Raymond Close, Hard Target: We Can't Defeat Terrorism With Bombs and
Bombast, WASH. POST Aug. 30, 1998, at Cl; Ralph Peters, We Don't have the Stomach for

This Kind of Fight, Id. ; Gregory Vistica and Evan Thomas, Hard of Hearing, NEWSWEEK 78
(Dec. 13, 1999) ("Washington has had difficulty finding its most-wanted terrorist, Osama bin
Laden, because Islamic extremists use European-made encrypted mobile phones."); Russell
Watson and John Barry, Our Target Was Terror, NEWSWEEK 24 (Aug. 31, 1998).
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II: International Legal Definitions, Origin, Sources and Debate on the
Theories of Self-Defense, Anticipatory Self-Defense, and Preemption
A. Evolution and the Use of a Self-Defense Doctrine in International Law
The international community recognized the legitimacy of a selfdefense doctrine long before the United Nations ever existed. 120 The concept
of a right of self-defense is rooted both the belief that a state has the right to
protect its interests and citizens where they reside, and in criminal law.' 2 1 At
common law, criminal law courts directed juries to consider whether claims of
self-defense were justified by the surrounding circumstances, including
whether a claimant had the opportunity to extricate himself or herself from the
affray. 122 Recognizing that the actions of a state can involve far more
complexities and intricacies than that of any single person, unlike in criminal
law, in international law, to constitute self-defense in international law, an act
123
need not be instantaneous, or even contemporaneous following an attack.
Also because of the complexities and intricacies of relations among states
relative to individual 24human interaction, international law departs from the
extrication principle. 1
120

Sean M. Condron, Justificationfor UnilateralAction in Response to the Iraqi Threat: A

Critical Analysis of Operation Desert Fox, 161 MIL. L. REV. 115,128 (1999), citing IAN
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 5, (1963). See also, e.g,
ANTHONY AREND AND ROBERT BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 72 (1993).

Arend and Beck write:
[T]he right of self-defense is one of the oldest legitimate reasons for states to resort to
force. Aristotle, Aquinas, and even the framers of the restrictive Kellog-Briand Pact
all acknowledged that it was permissible to take recourse to arms to defend oneself.
Under pre-Charter customary international law, a state could take recourse to force to
defend itself not only in response to an actual armed attack, but also in anticipation of
an imminent armed attack.
Id. at 72.
121See, e.g., D.P. CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 338 (1st ed. 1965).

The right to self-

defense is a right fundamental to every legal system and is circumscribed only to the extent to
which formal law assumes the responsibility for defending the individual. Id.
122 See, e.g., Tucker v. Ahitow, 52 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 1995).
123See,

e.g., Shoham, supra note 72, at 196, citing M. MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, LAW AND

MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 217
124

(1961).

See id., citing D. BOWETT, SELF DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 191-92 (1958); see also

Beth M. Polebaum, National Self-Defense in InternationalLaw: An Emerging Standardfor a
Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 187, 198-99 (1984). Polebaum opines:
The sources of international law provide a fairly consistent interpretation of the
requirement to exhaust alternative means. In most instances, satisfaction of the
requirement has ultimately depended less on the vigor with which alternative means
have been pursued than on the perception that the situation ihas become so desperate
that no time for nonmilitary efforts remained. When the :mminency requirement has
been satisfied, the alternative means requirement has also been found to be satisfied,
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These departures are well-rooted in customary international law. For
instance, in the 1837 Caroline Case, which is generally accepted by
international law scholars as the leading case on the customary international
law of self-defense, U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster wrote that in order
for an act to qualify as an exercise of self-defense, a state must be able to show
a "necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no moment for
deliberation."' 125 However, during the period between the Caroline Case and
the formation of the United Nations, states also considered it acceptable to
engage in military action where a state's neighbor state had massed forces
along the border between the two.126 The acceptability of a first strike was also
gauged against the level of threat of invasion from the invaded state. 127 No
doubt, the existence of traditional ethnically-rooted or nationalist-based
hostilities explained why the first strike doctrine of self-defense possessed
some credence: 128 the Nineteenth Century is replete with examples in which
one state invaded a region to protect its nationals or for the protection of
others.12 9 Indeed, in World War I, Tsarist Russia declared war on Habsburg
Austria as part of a policy of protecting Russia's "Slavic brethren." 130
However, following World War II, this concept of lawful military aggression
has largely been limited to situations of specific self-defense.

often without analysis of whether peaceful modes of resolution had been vigorously
sought.

Id.
30 BRITISH & FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 193 (1843), reprinted in Jennings, The Caroline and
McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 89 (1938). The facts of the Caroline Case arose in the
context of an insurrection in Canada in 1837, where insurgents moved supplies and gained
recruits from the United States. The Caroline was a steamer employed by an insurgent group.
On 29 December 1837, while the steamer was docked on the American side of the Niagara
River, Canadian soldiers crossed to the American side of the river, destroyed the ship, and
caused casualties among American citizens defending the vessel. British Foreign Minister
125

Lord Palmerston claimed a right of self-defense. However, after negotiations, his government

disagreed with this assessment and settled the case. See also note 176, infra.

126 See e.g. JOHN CHILDS, ARMIES AND WARFARE IN EUROPE, 1648-1789 (1982);

see also

RICHARD C. HALL, THE BALKAN WARS, THE PRELUDE TO THE FIRST WORLD WAR (2000); see
also GEOFFREY C. PARKER, THE CAMBRIDGE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF WARFARE, THE
TRIUMPH OF THE WEST, (1995); see also LESLIE C. GREENE, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF

CONFLICT 29-41 (2d ed. 2000).
ARMED
127
id.

128

Id.

129 id.
130

See, e.g., Ferro, supra note 44, at 1-30. See also generally, JAMES STOKESBURY, WORLD

WAR ONE (1985).
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B. U. N. Charter Article 51

In 1949, Article 51 of the U.N. Charter was incorporated, enshrining
states' inherent right of self-defense. 131 A brief discussion of its history is
important for a contextual understanding of this provision.
Article 51 was not found in the initial proposals for a United
The concept of a right of self-defense was introduced by the
Nations.
United States at the urging of Central and South American governments, which
desired recognition of a right of collective self-defense. 33 Additionally, the
signatories to the Charter recognized that the right of armed self-defense could
exist in situations before the Security Council could act.' 34 Thus, a state would
have to remain passive against an attack when the Security Council has not yet
acted on its behalf. Further, it does not appear within the debates surrounding
the implementation of Article 51 that any rejection of customary international
bar
law occurred. 135 Indeed, there are clear indications that Article 51 did not 36
1
action.
took
Council
Security
the
after
even
self-defense
in
force
of
use
the
No single international convention interprets or defines the threshold of
Article 51. 137 Thus, academic analysis is required to determine what
conditions are required under the general rubric of "defense," in order for a
state to permissibly respond to acts of terrorism. The International Court of
Justice (ICJ) has provided some guidance that is useful in this area, to which
our discussion next turns.
1. Nicaraguav. United States
While the plain language of Article 51 provides an inherent right of
self-defense, the concept of self-defense was not provided any definition
within the U.N. Charter itself. However, in the 1984 ICJ decision, Nicaragua
v. United States, some parameters were established as to what fails to
131

U. N.

CHARTER

art. 51.

See, Malvina Halberstam, The Right to Self-Defense Once the

Security Council Takes Action, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 229, 241 (1996).
132 See id. Halbertsam writes:

Article 51 was not in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for an International Organization.
It was added at the San Francisco Conference, by the United States at the urging of the
American republics. Some of the American republics were concerned that the powers
given to the Security Council might undermine the regional security arrangement
provided for by the Act of Chapultepec.
Id., citing Minutes of the Thirty Sixth Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held in San
Francisco, May 11, 1945, in 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 665, 665-70

(1945).
133 Halberstam, supra note 131, at 241.
134Id. at 242.
35

' Id. at 247.

136
137

Halberstam, supra note 131, at 248.
See, e.g., Sharp, supra note 119, at 41.
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constitute self-defense. 138 Both the facts and the holding of Nicaragua have a
bearing on the thesis of this article inasmuch as Nicaragua is distinguishable
from issues relating to terrorism, as will be explained.
In Nicaragua, the country of Nicaragua brought a claim before the ICJ
against the United States, specifically accusing the United States of attacking
oil pipelines, mining ports and violating air space. 139 Nicaragua also charged
the United States with training, arming, financing and supplying internal
paramilitary activities against the Nicaraguan government. 14, In turn, the
United States asserted a claim of collective self-defense as envisioned under
Article 51.141
As a starting point in its ensuing decision, the ICJ enunciated that it
was adhering to the principle of non-intervention, when measured against the
claimed right of self-defense. 142 The ICJ acknowledged that states have a right
of self-defense and conducted a lengthy customary international law
analysis. 143 However, the ICJ also held "States do not have a right of
"collective" armed response to acts which do not constitute an "armed
attack."' 14 4 Additionally, the ICJ stated, "the right of collective self-defense
presupposes that an armed attack has occurred."' 145 Additionally, it stated, in
the case of collective self-defense, the third-party state does not possess a right
to interpret146the danger to the victim state without the latter's own
assessment.
While an interpretation of the right of collective self-defense was
central to the Nicaragua decision, the parameters surrounding the concept of
self-defense were also enunciated. Yet, the limitations as to attacks on the
sovereignty of a state were not set within the plain language of Article 5 1.
138

While the United States asserted that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction to hear Nicaragua's claims,

the ICJ disagreed and heard the case with the United States in absentia. See Nicaragua v.
United States, 1986 I.C.J. 14,
24-26 (27 June)(Nicaragua).
1'Id. 15(b). Nicaragua alleged that the mining of its harbors were carried out by persons in
the direct pay of the U.S. Government and under the command of U. S. personnel, who also
participated. Id. 20. Additionally, Nicaragua claimed that there was damage to two fishing
vessels as a result of colliding with mines. During this time, Nicaragua attributed two deaths
and fourteen injured people to the mining. See id. 76.
140 Id. 15(a).
'41 See id.
165.
142 Id. 202. The Court held:
[T]he United States of America, by training, arming, equipping, financing, and
supplying the contra forces or otherwise, encouraging, supporting, and aiding military
and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, has acted against the Republic of
Nicaragua in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to
intervene in the affairs of another state.
Id. 146.
141
Id. 227.
144
Id. 211.
141
Id. 236.
146 Id.

205.
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Despite its lengthy analysis, the ICJ never mentioned any of the several
concepts pertinent to modem aspects of sovereignty, namely, aiding and
abetting terrorist organizations, anticipatory self-defense, and preemption.
Indeed, the ICJ's reliance on customary international law seems to indicate that
Article 51 did not eviscerate its usage. 147
C. Unresolved Definitions of Self-Defense
In part because of lack of clarity as to what constitutes a threat of force,
the conditions under which the right of self-defense may be applied, continue
to be debated. 148 Some scholars argue that the right of self-defense only may
be invoked after a state seeking to use force presents the international
community with credible evidence that it has suffered an attack, that a specific
entity is guilty of the attack, and that use of force is necessary to protect the
state from further injury. 149 Other scholars argue that the right of self-defense
has no such requirement because warfare is a continuing action until
conclusion by agreement, treaty or surrender. 150 However, a general consensus
exists that before self-defense is invoked, a state must have exhausted all

practicable means of forestalling the threatening attacks. 151 Additionally, a
consensus exists as to the
requirements of necessity and proportionality as
2
elements to a response. 15
141 Id. 183. The Court held:

It is of course axiomatic that the material of customary international law is to be
looked primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris of States, even though
multilateral conventions may have an important role to play in recording and defining
rules deriving from custom, or indeed in developing them.
Id., citing Continental Shelf, ICJ reports 1985, at 29-30 27. It is worth noting, however, that
the ICJ could only rely on customary international law, and not the U. N. Charter in its
decision because of the United States's multi-lateral treaty reservation to the jurisdiction of the
ICJ.
148 See Oscar Schacter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 U. MICH. L. REV. 1620,
1625 (1984). Schacter writes:
What is meant by a "threat of force" has received rather less consideration. Clearly a
threat to use military action to coerce a state to make concessions is forbidden. But,
in many situations, the deployment of military forces or missiles has unstated aims
and its effect is equivocal. The preponderance of military strength in some states and
their political relations with potential target states may justifiably lead to an inference
of a threat of force against the political independence of the target state.
Id.
1'9 See Jonathan I. Charney, The Use of Force Against Terrorism and International Law, 95
AM. J. INT'L L. 835, 836 (2001).

150 See, Dunlap, supra note 88, at 8.
151 Polebaum, supra note 124, at 198 (1984), citing D. BOWETT, SELF DEFENCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (1958).

152 Id. Regarding the necessity requirement, traditionally in order for an action to be deemed a
"necessity" of self-defense, the use of military coercion as a defensive measure must be in
reaction to the presence of an imminent threat, and must be limited to circumstances in which
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D. Anticipatory Self-Defense
The notions that the right of self-defense extends to circumstances in
which an attack is anticipated - and that a nation need not wait until it
experiences the consequences of an actual attack, date far back into history, at
least to the Seventeenth Century, as reflected in the writings of Grotius.' 53 A
number of international law scholars, including Anthony d' Amato and Louis
Rene Beres, define anticipatory self- defense along the lines of the Caroline
Case, as "an entitlement to strike first when the danger posed is instant,
overwhelming,154 leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation."
Differences between self-defense, as envisioned under Article 51, and
anticipatory self-defense, may also be found in Professor Schachter's
distinction between cases in which an armed attack is occurring, and, those in
which an armed attack has already occurred but additional attacks are
expected. 155 It may be the case that anticipatory self-defense applies to
situations where the claimant state possesses intelligence of an imminent attack
upon its territory or its nationals but no prior attack has occurred. In such a
case, the use of force does not constitute an act of reprisal, 156 but rather should
the facts reasonably show a continuing threat of armed attack, use of force
would constitute permissible anticipatory self-defense. This scenario appears
to address the realities of warfare, both historic and modem. Of course,
justifications for anticipatory self-defense must still comply with necessity and
proportionality requirements.
There is general agreement among international legal scholars that
customary international law recognized a right to anticipatory self-defense long

no effective peaceful alternative is available given the time constraints involved. See Capt.
Samuel R. Maizel, Intervention in Grenada,35 NAVAL L. REV. 47, 71-72 (1986). Regarding
the "proportionality" requirement, the traditional formulation is as follows: Force used must be
proportionate to the threat and cannot exceed measures strictly necessary to repel a threat. Id.
at 73. The implication is that the threatening source is where a response should be directed.
One U.N. Resolution expresses this sentiment: "In the conduct of military operations every
effort should be made to spare civilian populations from the ravages of war, and all necessary
precautions should be made to avoid injury, loss or damage to civilian populations." G.A. Res.
2675 (XXV), Resolution On Protection of Civilians, reprinted in 1 THE LAW OF WAR 755
(Friedman, ed. 1972).
153 Louis Rene Beres, InternationalLaw and Nuclear Terrorism, 24 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1,
31 (1994). Id., citing GROTIus, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE CH. 1 (1625).
154 Anthony d'Amato, Open
Forum: Israel's Air Strike Against the Osiraq Reactor: A
Retrospective, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L. J., 259, 261 (1996), citing Louis Rene Beres &
Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, supra note 78, at 438.
'55 OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 152 (1991).
156 Id.
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before Article 51 existed.157 The Caroline Case not only enunciated the
standard of anticipatory self-defense, it also provided an example of when
anticipatory self-defense measures were not justified. 158 From the facts of the
case, it could hardly be argued that the threat of attack was so imminent as to
allow Canadian forces to respond with military force against the vessel.
While the Caroline Case may be seen as a "negative" example in the
sense of showing what did not constitute a right of self-defense, the 1967 Six
Day War provides a positive example. 159 In the Six Day War example,
described earlier in this article, Egyptian forces had not yet crossed into Israel
when the Israeli government initiated an attack. 160 However, Israeli
intelligence confirmed, and the Egyptian government later admitted, an
Egyptian attack was imminent by the time the Israeli strike occurred. 161
Consequently, there has been little serious criticism by international law
scholars of the involved Israeli military actions.
The Israeli strike on the Osiraq nuclear facility provides another
example to explore the limits of anticipatory self-defense.
The Iraqi
government pursued the acquisition of fissile material to construct a nuclear
weapon, and had made public anti-Israeli statements prior to the Israeli attack,
calling for the destruction of Israel. Moreover, the Iraqi government supported
other anti-Israeli entities. However, because there was no imminent threat to
Israel 162 posed by the Iraqi nuclear facility, even though Israel viewed the
reactor as a long-term threat, it is doubtful that the Israeli response qualifies as
an act of anticipatory self-defense. Professors d'Amato and Beres differ over
the legality of the Israeli use of force in the Osiraq incident. Beres views the
Israeli destruction of the Osiraq nuclear facility as a justified act of anticipatory
self-defense. 163 However, D'Amato disagrees, opining that the use of this
doctrine is narrowly limited to situations involving an imminent threat to
survival. 16 4 As discussed below, the Israeli strike was more likely an act of
preemption than anticipatory self-defense.
Anticipatory self-defense is not codified anywhere in the U.N. Charter,
including Article 51, which, as noted above, addresses permissible self-defense.
As a result, some scholars and practitioners of international law argue that
157 Condron, supra note 120, at 130, citing ANTHONY CLARK AREND
& ROBERT J. BECK,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 5 (1993).
158 See, e.g., PHILIP JESSUP, THEUSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 165 (1959).
159 The Six Day War occurred after sustained threats by Arab governments, including Egypt,

Jordan, and Syria, indicating their intentions to attack Israel, culminating with a large buildup
of forces on Israeli borders. The Israeli government opted to strike first against its opposing
forces.
16o MICHAEL OREN, SiX DAYS OF WAR: JUNE

EAST

63 (2002).

1967

Id.
See, e.g., Sucharitkul, supra note 93, at 318.
163 Id.
161
162

164

D'Amato, supra note 154, at 263.
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AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN MIDDLE

because the charter does not provide such a right, usage of anticipatory selfdefense is no longer recognized as valid under international law.' 65 Moreover,
"plain language" school adherents 166 have argued that Article 51 allows the
right of self-defense "only if an armed attack occurs." '1 67 Their view is that
since the adoption of the U.N. Charter, any position
supporting anticipatory
68
self-defense would render Article 51 superfluous.'
The "restrictionist" argument is based essentially on three premises.
First, it assumes that it is solely the responsibility of the United Nations to
ensure the maintenance of international peace and security. 169 Second, it
assumes that the United Nations has sole authority over the lawful use of force,
with the narrow exception of self-defense cases in which an armed attack has
occurred on the territory of a state.' 70 Third, it assumes that if any states were
permitted to use force for any reason beyond clear individual or collective selfdefense, they would inevitably broaden this narrow mandate, using it as a
pretext for desired policy ends. 171
Those taking a much broader view of permissible use of force,
sometimes referred to as "counter-restrictionists," argue that customary
international law pre-dating Article 51 remains viable so long as it is not
prohibited by codified law or newer custom.' 72 The fact that Israel was never
165See AREND & BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE

131(1993) (discussing

the "restrictionist" viewpoint, which the authors ultimately reject).
166 Sometimes known as "restrictionists." See, e.g., John-Alex Romano, Note: Combating
Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reviving the Doctrine of a State of Necessity,
87 GEO. L. J. 1023, 1035 (1999), quoting AREND & BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE
OF FORCE, 154-55 (1993).

167
Jessup, supra note 158, at 165. Jessup used as an example the British seizure of the Danish
fleet in 1807. Id. At the time of the seizure, Denmark was a neutral country. However,
Napoleon had clear designs on the occupation of Denmark as a strategic move to block British
commerce into Russia, as evidenced by his military strategy of isolating Britain from
commerce, and his building of alliances against Britain. Id. In anticipation of Napoleon's
invasion of Denmark, the Royal Navy seized the Danish fleet. According to Jessup, such a
move would have been in violation of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Id. at 166.
In contrast, Jessup indicated that the U. S. pursuit of Pancho Villa's forces into
Mexico in 1916 would have been permitted if it were judged under an Article 51 standard. Id.
Likewise, Jessup also believed the movement of British, French, German, Russian, Italian, and
Japanese forces into Peking in 1900 during the Boxer Rebellion was also justified because
their purpose was to protect nationals at the legations in that city. Id. at 170.
168 IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 72-74 (1963).
169 Thomas C. Wingfield, Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad, 104 DICK. L. REV. 439,
461 (2000), citing Ronald R. Riggs, The Grenada Intervention:A Legal Analysis, 109 MIL. L.
REV. 1, 22 (1985). See also Charney, supra note 149, at 836. Chamey writes, "To limit the
use of force in international relations, which is the primary goal of the U.N. Charter, there must
be checks on its use of self defense... It is limited to situations where the state is truly required
to defend itself from serious attack." Id.
170 Wingfield, supra note 169, at 461, citing AREND & BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
USE OF FORCE: BEYOND THE U.N. CHARTER PARADIGM 94 (1993).

171Wingfield, supra note 169, at 462.
172 Id. at 462.
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universally condemned by the international community for its use of
anticipatory self-defense measures in the Six Day War would have significance
73
to them in evaluating the international permissibility of the Israeli measure. 1
Counter-restictionists have argued that this lack of condemnation
shows the continued viability of anticipatory self-defense as a principle of
customary international law. Indeed, the U.N. General Assembly did not
condemn the Israeli strike. 174 Of course, restrictionists could argue that in the
post-Cold War era, the Six Day War example is less significant than counterrestrictionists might claim, because the threat to Israel consisted of
significantly numerically superior opposing forces that were Soviet-backed and
equipped, a situation no longer existing. However, the reality remains that
even in recent years, there has been authoritative reliance on the existence of
anticipatory self-defense as formulated and sustained by customary
international law. In this respect, the discussion of anticipatory self-defense in
the Nicaragua decision is particularly important. As noted above, the 175
ICJ held
that the U.N. Charter did not supersede custom, but exists alongside it.
The U. S. position is that anticipatory self-defense is inherent in the
basic right of self-defense.176 The current U.S. administration has incorporated
the doctrine as part of its overall national security policy, claiming the right to

'73

See, e.g., Robert F. Turner, Its Not Really Assassination. Legal and Moral Implications of

Intentionally Targeting Terroristsand Aggressor-State Regime Elites, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 787,

803 (2003). See also, e.g., S. Malawer, Studies in International Law 192-94 (1977); see also,
Beth M. Polebaum, supra note 124, at 191.
174 Polebaum, supra note 124, at 193.
175 See, Nicaragua v. United States 1986 I.C.J. 14
183 (27 June). See, also, Maureen F.
Brennan, Avoiding Anarchy: Bin Ladin Terrorism, The U.S. Response and the Role of
Customary InternationalLaw, 59 LA. L. REV. 1195, 1200 (1999). It must be noted that the
ICJ expressly held that it was not addressing the legality of anticipatory self-defense because
the issue had not been raised.
176 Dunlap, supra note 80, at 26, citing Int'l and Operational Law Dep't, The
Judge Advocate
General's School, U.S. Army, JA 422,

OPERATIONAL

LAW HANDBOOK 4-5 (2003). Dunlap

writes:
The accepted customary international law rule of anticipatory self-defense has its
origin in an 1842 Incident in which the British navy caught the American steamship,
the Caroline ferrying rebel forces and supplies into Canada.... They ultimately agreed
that customary international law allows for the use of force against an imminent threat
if such force constitutes, "a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving
no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."
This restrictive definition of anticipatory self-defense is still widely accepted as
customary international law, despite its obvious limitations in a modern era of
intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range supersonic aircraft, nuclear submarines,
cruise missiles, and biological weapons.
Id.
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attack terrorists and their supporters before they strike first. 177 This claim has
been extended to protection of allies and national interests. 178
E. Definition of Preemption
As noted above, the concept of anticipatory self-defense dates back to
at least Grotius, who thought that nations are entitled to the same principle
enjoyed by persons, who may lawfully kill whomever is attempting to kill
79
them.1
Thefirst
concept
of preemption
in customary
lawwrote:
also has a
long history,
articulated
in rudimentary
form byinternational
de Vattel, who
The safest plan is to prevent evil where that is possible. A nation has
the right to resist the injury another seeks to inflict upon it, and to use force and
every other just means of resistance against the aggressor. It may even
anticipate the other's design, being careful, however, not to act upon vague80 and
doubtful suspicions, lest it should run the risk of becoming the aggressor. 1
Given the current U.S. administration's widely publicized justification
for its military operations against Iraq, preemption may be viewed by some as
a new doctrine. It may be argued that it is indeed a new, and not widely
accepted, term to international law. In reality, however, preemption has been a
long-standing international legal doctrine, which differs from anticipatory selfdefense primarily in its timing. More specifically, the former doctrine allows
states greater leeway, in the presence of hostile intentions and capabilities, to
mount an attack to avert an opposing attack, rather than require a nation to wait
until shortly before, or even after, an attack is absorbed, as the latter doctrine
contemplates. 181 The preemption doctrine presupposes that in situations in
which a state believes an attack on itself is likely, given available intelligence
emanating from another state, the concerned state may respond militarily to
protect itself.
177 The White House National Security Strategy of the United States of America 12 (2002).
This Strategy Statement reads, in pertinent part:
We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are
able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our
allies and friends... It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature
of this new threat. Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can
no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to
deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of
potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not
permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first.
Id., in Dunlap, supra note 88, at 27.
178 Id.
79 Beres, supra note 153, at 31, citing Grotius.
80 Beres, supra note 153, at 31, citing EMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS,
Book II
(1758).
181 id.
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As referenced above, an example of preemptive military action may be
found in the Israeli strike on the Osiraq nuclear facility. In that situation, Iraq
had not engaged in a military strike on Israel or made specific threats regarding
the possibility of a nuclear or other attack on Israel, nevertheless the Israeli
government became convinced that the primary purpose of the facility was to
enable a future strike against Israel, given prior threatening statements and
actions of the Iraqi regime.
Other examples of preemption include certain U.S. responses to prior
acts of terrorism. For instance, on April 14, 1986, in response to a bombing of
a West German discotheque in which an American serviceman and a Turkish
woman were killed, and more than 230 other persons injured, the United States
launched air strikes against five terrorist-related targets in Libya. 182 Based on
intercepted and decoded exchanges between Tripoli and the Libyan embassy in
East Berlin, the United States claimed that this 83attack was one of a continuing
series of Libyan state-ordered terrorist attacks.'
This argument had some appeal since Libyan leader Colonel Momar
Qadhafi had made frequent public statements announcing Libya's right to
export terrorism. 184 Moreover, it was estimated that Libya spent an estimated
100 million dollars annually operating over a dozen camps where over 1,000
terrorists 1were
trained in guerrilla warfare, explosives, and arms for use in
85
sabotage.
In the aftermath of its attack on Libya, the United States argued to the
U.N. Security Counsel that it had acted in self-defense, in response to a
continuing series of attacks.' 86 However, the actions of the United States
comport more with preemption than anticipatory self-defense. As the United
States did not have intelligence indicating a specific attack was likely at a
certain point in the near future, it cannot be reasonably argued that the United
States faced a situation in which it was facing a danger that was instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.
In short, while the likelihood of Libyan state-sponsored terrorism continued,
the United States could not assess with particularity when a terrorist strike
would occur.

182

See, e.g., Jack M. Beard, Military Action Against Terrorists Under International Law:

America's New War on Terror and the Case for Self-Defense Under InternationalLaw, 25
HARV. J. L. PUB. POL'Y 559, 561 (2002).

183 Id., citing Bob Woodward & Patrick E. Tyler, Libyan Cables Intercepted and Decoded,
WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1986, at Al. Libya disclaimed responsibility for the discotheque
bombing. Eleven years later, the United States permitted decoded interception transcripts to be
made public in the Berlin Chamber Court. Consequently, persons affiliated with the Libyan
embassy in East Berlin were indicted in the court for the bombing. Id.
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Gregory F. Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An InternationalLegal Analysis, 19
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I1. VIABILITY OF PREEMPTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW
Historically, the United States and the international community have
viewed acts of terrorism as crimes, rather than acts of war. 187 In part, this may
be due in part because of the constrained resources of terrorists, who
historically have conducted mainly limited attacks with high symbolism, such
as political assassinations. Whatever the reason, the United States generally
pursued a theory that it has "long-arm" jurisdiction to prosecute airplane
hijackers in the Middle East and elsewhere, in circumstances where U.S.
citizens or its nationals were victimized. 188 Further, U.S. courts also have
allowed trials of terrorists to be held notwithstanding protests by the
defendants that their actions constituted acts of war. Individuals implicated in
the 1993 attempted destruction of the World Trade Center, for instance, were
prosecuted before a U.S. District Court, despite the individuals' contention of
being engaged in a holy war. 189 Further, the international community has
permitted the prosecution of crimes before civilian tribunals. In both the
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the International
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), civilians, government officials, and 90
military
officers and enlisted men, have been prosecuted forjus cogens crimes.'
While international law regarding the use of force by states sheds
important light on how nations may fight to defend their citizens against nonstate actors such as terrorists, international criminal law provides less guidance
on how a nation may take legal action against terrorists abroad.' 9 1 In part, this
lack of clarity is due to the jeolous manner in which each state has protected its
187
See, e.g., Responding to Terrorism, Crime, Punishment, and War 115 HARV. L. REV. 1217
(2002). See also Dunlap, supra note 88, at 24.

188 See, e.g., United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also 101 F.3d 239 (2d
Cir. 1996).
89
1 See Benjamin Weiser, "Mastermind' and Driver Found Guilty in 1993 Plot to Blow Up

Trade Center, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1997, at Al.
190
See generally, Anthony Sammons, The 'Under-Theorization' of Universal Jurisdiction:
Implicationsfor Legitimacy on Trials of War Criminals by National Courts, 21 BERKELEY J.

INT'L L. 111 (2003); Kelly D. Askin, ProsecutingWartime Rape and Other Gender-Related
Crimes under InternationalLaw: ExtraordinaryAdvances, Enduring Obstacles, 21 BERKELEY
J. INT'L L. 288 (2003).
191 See, e.g,. Timothy L.H. McCormack, Selective Reaction to Atrocity: War Crimes and the
Development of International Criminal Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 681, 730-31 (1997).

McCormack argues that state interest is likely to hamper prosecuting certain classes of
offenses before the International Court. Id. See also, e.g., Susan Dente Ross, In the Shadow of
Terror: The Illusive FirstAmendment Rights of Aliens, 6 COMM. L. & POL'Y 75 (2001). Ross

writes that prior to 11 September 2001, the Clinton administration attempts to curb terrorism
through criminal law were sometimes criticized as gifts to Israel. Id. at 78. That is, several of
the individuals prosecuted for terrorist acts during the Clinton administration were primarily
interested in the destruction of Israel. Opponents of Israel felt that the United States court
system should not be utilized to remove these individuals from the opportunity to attack Israeli
interests.
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own jurisdiction to prosecute domestic crimes that occur within their own
borders.
It is, however, well accepted that states possess a right to prosecute
individuals forjus cogens offenses such as "crimes against humanity."' 192 For
example, it has been widely accepted that Israel possessed the right to
prosecute Adolf Eichmann, who oversaw the massacres of Jews and other
target groups during the period of Nazi Germany.193 Eichmann was ultimately
prosecuted before a public Israeli tribunal, and Argentina received nothing
more than an explanation from the Israeli government 194 after his abduction
from Argentina to Israel.
The abduction nevertheless generated both
diplomatic and scholarly debate.' 95 Indeed, the Argentine Government, which
had earlier disavowed knowledge of Eichmann's whereabouts, complained to
the Security Council, which indicated that Israel should make reparations to
Argentina.
196 Thus, the means of obtaining jurisdiction over the person
remains problematic
given the current state of international law.
See, e.g., Regina v. Finta, 1 S.C.R. 701, Supreme Court of Canada, March 24, 1994 (Finta).
In Finta,Canada asserted domestic jurisdiction over a Lithuanian for Nazi era war crimes. See
also, e.g., Bruce Broomhall, Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects:
Towards the Development of an Effective System of Universal Jurisdictionfor Crimes Under
International Law, 35 NEw ENG. L. REV. 399 (2001). See also Prosecutor v. Niyonteze,
Tribunal militaire de division 2, Lausanne, Apr. 30, 1999, in which a Swiss military court
agreed it possessed jurisdiction over a Rwandan mayor accused of war crimes originating in
Rwandan genocide.
193 Attorney Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 Int'l L. Rep. 5 (Isr. Dist. Ct. - Jerusalem
1961),
af'd, 36 Int'l L. Rep. 277 (Isr. Sup. Ct. 1962). See also, e.g. Beverly Izes, Drawing Lines in
the Sand: When State-Sanctioned Abductions of War Criminals Should be Permitted, 31
COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 1, 18 (1997) Izes writes:
Other authorities justify Israel's action under the international legal principle of
"extradite or prosecute." This principle holds that no state should offer a safe haven to
individuals who are accused of serious crimes under international law. Applying this
theory to the Eichmann abduction, because Argentina had made no attempt to
prosecute Eichmann in the ten years he had been living in Argentina, Israel had an
international right to abduct Eichmann and adjudicate his case. Many commentators
have suggested that Eichmann's abduction may have been justified due to the "nature
and extent of the crimes charged" and "the impossibility of extradition of Nazis from
Argentina;" in some situations, they argued, "positive law must yield to the natural
and moral law."
Id. citing Zad Leavy, The Eichmann Trial and the Role of Law, 48 A.B.A. J. 820, 822 (1962).
192

194 Id.

195 See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, International Kidnapping: State-Sponsored Abduction, A
Comment on UnitedStates v. Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 746, 748 n.8 (1992).
196 See Id. In response, the Security Council adopted a resolution
that read:
Considering that the violation of the sovereignty of a Member State is incompatible
with the Charter of the United Nations ... [and n]oting that the repetition of acts such
as that giving rise to this situation would involve a breach of the principles upon
which international order is founded creating an atmosphere of insecurity and distrust
incompatible with the preservation of peace ... the Government of Israel [is] to make
appropriate reparation in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
rules of international law.
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In recent years, states have successfully prosecutedjus cogens offenses
after obtaining personal jurisdiction over individuals.
For instance,
Switzerland prosecuted and convicted before a military court, a former
197
Rwandan mayor, who initially entered Switzerland under a grant of asylum.
Before trial, the Swiss government refused to allow him to leave
Switzerland. 198

Prosecuting terrorists under the approach used by the Swiss is
problematic for several reasons. First, the state must have possession of the
individual, which is particularly problematic for countries, such as the United
States, which would like to pursue many known terrorist enemies located
abroad. Second, there is no accountability for states that may have harbored,
or otherwise supported, terrorists. Otherwise stated, the Swiss approach
focuses on the individuals who directly perpetrate terrorist acts, as opposed to
the states that may indirectly support such acts. This may be as a result of
limited Swiss law enforcement and military capabilities. In any event, the
Swiss approach, which is limited to situations in which a terrorist is found
within the jurisdiction of the state willing to prosecute, does not address the
reality and global scope of modem terrorism.
In addition to reviewing the doctrines of preemption and anticipatory
self-defense with a view toward how they may be useful in taking action
against terrorism, the international community must more fully acknowledge
the criminality of terrorism.
U.N. action over the past thirty-five years
provides evidence that this recognition is taking hold. In 1970, General
Assembly Resolution 2625 affirmed that:
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating,
assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State
or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the
commission of such acts, when199the acts referred to in the present paragraph
involve a threat or use of force.
Additionally, on December 9, 1985, the U.N. General Assembly
unanimously approved Resolution 40/61, which not only unequivocally
condemned all acts of terrorism as criminal, but also called upon states "to
fulfill their obligations under international law to refrain from organizing,
instigating, assisting, or participating in terrorist acts against other states, or
acquiescing in activities within their territory directed towards the commission
of such acts.", 20 0 Moreover, in March of 1992, the U.N. Security Council

Id., citing U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 868th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960).
197 See e.g. Broomhall, supra note 192, at 405.
198 Id.

'99 G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 2 5th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 122, U.N. Doc. A/8010 (1970).
200 Beard, supra note 182, at 580. G.A. Res. 40/61, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at
302, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985).
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explicitly linked a state's involvement with terrorism to its obligations under
U.N. Charter Article 2, Paragraph 4.2° 1

Fortunately, an increased willingness exists in the international
community to take action against those who would support terrorists. For
example, in Resolution 748, the Security Council imposed economic sanctions
on Libya for its continuing involvement with terrorist activities and its refusal
to extradite two Libyan nationals alleged to have been involved in the 1988
bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. In Resolution 748,
the Council reaffirmed a principle reflected in General Assembly Resolution
2625, stating:
In accordance with Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United
Nations, every State has a duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting
or participating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized
activities within its territory directed toward 20the
commission of such acts,
2
when such acts involve a threat or use of force.
Thus, in recent years, there has been greater international recognition
that terrorism is not merely a phenomenon that can be considered to an
alternative to conventional use of force by states; rather, it is a crime that must
be addressed by the world community as a crime. 20 3 The specific goals of
Islamic-based terrorist movements, such as al Qaeda include the forced
subjugation of religious and other freedoms to a theocracy. 204 This
demonstrates an open willingness to defy basic rights recognized as belonging
to all humanity.
Furthermore, the methods used to achieve their aims,
particularly the targeting of civilians, as noted above, stand clearly contrary to
international law. 20 5 Thus, this contemporary form of religious-based terrorism
cannot be equated with traditional state use of force; rather it constitutes a
crime under international law.
Beyond attaching criminal liability to those individuals who engage in
terrorist acts, international law also assigns analogous responsibility to states
that support such individuals. 2 06 The Security Council reaffirmed this principle
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Beard, supra note 182, at 580.
Id., citing S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063d mtg. at 52, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748

(1992).

203 See e.g., President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People (Sept. 20, 2001). See also, e.g., State Department, Fact Sheet: Usama bin
Ladin
(Aug.
21,
1998),
at
http://www.state.gov/www/rezions/
africa/fs<uscore>bin<uscore>ladin.html.
204

Id.
Id.
206 See, e.g., John A. Cohen, Formulation of a State's Response to Terrorism and State205

Sponsored Terrorism, 14 PACE INT'L L. REV. 77, 89 (2002), citing Richard B. Lillich & John
M. Paxman, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens Occasioned by Terrorist Activities, 26
AM. U. L. REV. 217, 221 (1976); see also, e.g., Gregory F. Intoccia, supra note 184, at 178.
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in response to Libyan sponsorship of terrorist groups,20 7stating that state support
of terrorism constituted an inherently illegal activity.
Despite these "gains" in the effort to counter terrorism, international
law has yet to fully wed a standard of "aiding and abetting" to the doctrine of
state responsibility. Nevertheless, the Security Council, after the 11 September
2001 attacks, may have indirectly reflected a preemptive right against states
that support terrorism under certain conditions, through its adoption of
Resolution 1373.208 In this ground-breaking resolution, the Security Council
ordered states to refrain from various actions likely to aid terrorism. 20 9 These
actions include state financing of terrorist activities as well as prohibiting
nationals, or other persons within state borders from financing terrorist
activities. 210 Additionally, the Security Council resolution requires states to
refrain from providing active or passive support for persons involved in
terrorist acts. 211 Most importantly, the resolution proscribes states from
providing safe haven to not only terrorist organizations, but also to individuals
who actively aid them.21 2 While the Security Council cannot create binding
international law, the Council's ability to authorize enforcement of resolutions
213
through U.N. Charter, Chapter VII authority, should give states pause.
Moreover, Resolution suggests that if preemption against a criminal
organization is warranted, the concept of "aiding and abetting" could possibly
be used to justify preemptive use of force against states that aid and abet
terrorist organizations and refuse to remove them from their respective
territories.
A. Aiding and Abetting: a Key to the Viability of Preemption
Doctrine
Both anticipatory self-defense and preemption appear to have gained
greater vitality as usable doctrines in the fight against terrorism in light of the
Security Council's relatively new Resolution 1373 "aiding and abetting"
standard. States may forfeit their traditional international law protections when
they aid and abet a religious-based terrorist organization that plans to commit
jus cogens offenses.
Although each state has a different criminal code, it may be helpful to
understand the potential vitality of "aiding and abetting" in light of U.S.
domestic law, which treats "aiding and abetting" as a recognized offense.
See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, Res. 731 (1992).
See S.C. Res 1373 (28 Sept., 2001), at 40 I.L.M. 1278 (2001).
209 Id. See also, e.g., Paul C. Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT'L L.
901, 902 (2002).
210 S.C. Res/1373 at l(a),(d).
211 S.C. Res/1373 at 2(a).
212 S.C. Res/1373 at 2(c).
207
208

213 See U.N. CHARTER Chap. VII; see Szasz, supra note 209, at 902-904.

Combating Terrorism-121

"Aiding and abetting" does not constitute any element of a particular crime
because the concept provides a means for convicting a person for an. offense
caused by a principal. 2 14 In the domestic context, there are usually two
components to criminal offenses: actus reus and mens rea. Actus reus refers to
physical act or behavior, while mens rea denotes the actor's mental
the actual
15
state.

2

In U.S. municipal criminal law, to constitute "aiding and abetting," (1)
the principal must commit a' substantive offense; and (2) the defendant charged
with the aiding and abetting must have consciously shared the principal's
21 6
knowledge of the underlying criminal act, and intended to help the principal.
The actus reus element of aiding and abetting is generally easy to discern
because under a theory of accomplice liability, to be guilty, the defendant must
commit an act in furtherance of the-principal's offense.2 17
For example, where a defendant supplied the principle with a weapon
later used in a bank robbery, the actus reus requirement is satisfied. 218 On the
other hand, the defendant's mental state is important in assessing whether the
mens rea was present to prove guilt. Indeed, the defendant's beforehand
knowledge of the principal's offense is central in determining applicable mens
rea for accomplice liability. However, a classic formulation of aider and
abettor liability does not make the knowledge requirement facially clear
because some courts have construed this requirement to mean less than full
knowledge of an intended act. 2 19 That is, the quantum of knowledge required
to constitute criminality is often a matter for the trier of fact to decide. For
example, in United States v. Hill, a case involving an illegal gambling
enterprise, the Sixth Circuit defined knowledge as "the general scope and
nature... and awareness of the general facts concerning the venture." 220 Thus,
the knowledge requirement is less than a full knowing of the intricacies of a
perpetrated crime, but rather, knowledge of the general purpose of the related
action.
214

See 18 U.S.C. § 2. The statute does not define a separate crime, but rather provides another

means of convicting someone of assisting another in committing the underlying offense. See,
e.g., United States v. Sorrells, 145 F.3d 744, 751 (5th Cir. 1998). In that case, the Fifth
Circuit listed three elements of proof to establish guilt of "aiding and abetting" under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2. First, the defendant must have been associated with the criminal venture. Second, the
defendant must have participated in the venture. Third, the defendant must have sought by
action to make the venture succeed. Id.
215 Blacks Law Dictionary defines actus reus as the "physical aspect of a crime", whereas mens
rea involves the intent factor, or the "subjective mindset". BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 36 (6th
ed. 1990).
216 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2(a); see also, Nye & Nissan v. United States, 336 U.S. 613 (1949);
see also United States v. Spinney, 65 F.3d 231 (1st Cir 1995).
217 See, e.g., United States v. Pipola, 83 F.3d 556, 562 (2d Cir. 1995).
218 Id.
219 See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 55 F.3d 1197, 1201 (6th Cir. 1995) quoting United States v.
Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir 1938).
220 Id.
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Similar concepts are applicable in the international law context. For
instance, in the ICTY case, Prosecutor v. Furundzi/a,22 1 the trial and appellate
chamber recognized the actus reus of aiding and abetting in international
criminal law requires practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support
which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.222 Moreover,
such assistance "need not constitute an indispensable element, that is a conditio
sine qua non, for the acts of the principle." 223 In this case, Furundzija was
found to have aided and abetted several crimes against humanity by
encouraging others to commit those crimes. 224 And in another case, in
Prosecutorv. Musema,225 the ICTR defined the actus reus element as "all acts
of assistance in the form of either physical or moral support that substantially
contribute to the commission of the crime." 226 As reflected in these cases, it is
not necessary for an accomplice to share the mens rea of the perpetrator, in the
sense of a positive intention to commit the crime; instead, the threshold
requirement is merely that the accomplice have knowledge that his actions will
assist the perpetrator in the commission of the crime. 22 7 In Musema, the
tribunal defined mens rea as, "[knowledge] of the assistance he was providing
in the commission of the actual offense. ' 2 28 Illustrating an application of these
standards in another ICTR case, in Prosecutorv. George Ruggio22 9 the tribunal
found a journalist guilty as a de facto aider and abettor by the journalist's
making several broadcasts encouraging Hutu to kill Tutsi.23°
It follows logically from the above discussion that where states
knowingly harbor international terrorist organizations, they are "aiding and
abetting" those organizations. It was widely reported that the Taliban
government in Afghanistan did so with respect to al Qaeda. Likewise, the
Libyan government's sponsorship of individuals implicated in the Lockerbie
aircraft bombing would also constitute aiding and abetting under international
law.
When a state is harboring or otherwise supporting a terrorist
organization planning attacks in contravention of the laws of war, such as is
the case in which a terrorist group intentionally targets civilian and clearly
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1 d. 126.
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non-military structures, the potentially impacted state must be allowed to
There is sufficient existing doctrine and
respond to avert the attacks.
precedence under international law to allow a state to exercise preemptive
force against such terrorist organizations. This is an important principle
because of the unpredictability and lawlessness of the terrorist organizations
acts, magnified by the potentially huge damage that they could cause, given
technological advances. This right of preemption should be narrowly construed,
however, in recognition of its potential for abuse, with applicability only to
organizations espousing and practicing activities that clearly violate the laws
and customs of war.
IV. CONCLUSION
With the end of the Cold War, terrorism has emerged as the gravest
threat facing national and international security. A new wave of terrorism
driven by an extremist theology presents a particular ongoing threat. For
instance, the several terrorist organizations discussed in this article, eschew
contemporary well-settled international understandings of human rights as well
as the laws and customs of war. While there is an international law consensus
against the direct targeting of civilians, these groups and others simply do not
subscribe to this prohibition.
Not all terrorist organizations use the same means for achieving their
desired goals. Particularly dangerous, however, are some militant Islamic
groups whose stated views are Islamicizing regions of the world by waging a
"holy war" and who have no compunction against murdering the innocent in
pursuant of this quest. Their literal interpretation of Quaranic scripture
coupled with their conduct in resorting to violent acts of terrorism, certainly
provides evidence as to this goal.
International law regarding the use of force has developed in response
to centuries of interstate warfare. U.N. Charter Article 51 reflect this history.
However, reliance on the protections of Article 51 alone would leave
governments prostrate in defeating the threat of terrorism. States not only have
a duty to ensure basic human rights are enforced, they also have an obligation
to protect their citizens and residents from crime. Terrorism is not only a
See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Dec. 12, 1977, art.
51(4)(a), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 26, 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1413 (prohibiting attacks not directed at
military objectives); Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, BoobyTraps and Other Devices (Protocol II), Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use
of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to
Have Indiscriminate Effects, Apr. 10, 1981, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, 168, 19 I.L.M 1523, 1529,
Protocol II, art. 3(2),1342 U.N.T.S. at 169, 19 I.L.M. at 1530 (prohibiting direction of
landmines against civilians).
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threat to national security; it constitutes ajus cogens crime. Within the context
of areas of the law in which criminal law and international law have merged
the protections of both anticipatory self-defense and preemption must be
asserted. Given modem advances in destructive capability and the growing
willingness of groups to take the lives of the innocent to further religious their
own beliefs, there is no reasonable alternative. Because of the dangers of
abuse and military adventurism, each doctrine must be used sparingly, and
applications carefully scrutinized. Where one state threatens another directly
or indirectly by granting terrorist groups safe haven or other support, the
anticipatory self-defense doctrine may prove to be an acceptable response,
provided the response meets the proportionality and necessity tests. Likewise,
where a state grants terrorist groups safe haven or offers other support, the
state may be subject to military attack through the preemption doctrine.
Finally, where a non-state actor is able to conduct its operations without state
assistance, even though these operations are clandestinely effected without
state knowledge, the situs of terrorist activity should be considered a legitimate
target under either doctrine. However, the particular acts of terrorism in either
case must be the key to an assessment of the permissible use of either doctrine
under the circumstances. The terrorist organization must, through evidence of
past actions and stated doctrine (e.g., disavowal of international law) pose a
threat to the freedoms, health, and safety, of the citizens and residents of the
state. In these circumstances, the use of military force should be justifiable.

Combating Terrorism-125

